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Abstract
We propose an extension of CoalitionalATL (a logic for reasoning about coalitions and their formation process,
see [10]) by goals. This goal framework allows for a finer grained modeling of coalitions: Coalitional frame-
works, based on Dungs’s abstract argumentation framework, are used to point out conflicts between agents, and
goals refer to agents’ subjective incentives to join (or not to join) coalitions. We focus on two different aspects
for cooperation allowing a more practical modeling of systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
In the context of multi-agent systems (MAS), modeling and reasoning about coalitions and their abil-
ities are of utmost importance. In particular, it has been shown recently that argumentation provides
a sound setting to model reasoning about coalition formation in multi-agent systems [3, 4] and that
alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [2] can successfully be used to model MAS. The latter is prob-
ably the most influential logic of strategic ability that has emerged in recent years. However, it lacks
to express why agents should cooperate: The focus is solely on pure abilities of predefined coalitions
(whatever the reasons for cooperation might be).
In [10] a first step in merging both areas was taken. The presented logic, CoalitionalATL (ATLc ),
focuses on reasonable coalitions. The main question addressed is the following: “Is there a reasonable
coalition which can enforce ϕ?” rather than “Does a given group A has the ability to enforce ϕ?”.
Here, reasonable refers to the computation of coalitions modeled in terms of a given argumentation
semantics [12] (e.g. stable or preferred) in the context of coalition formation [3].
One of the features of ATLc is that it is based on a framework combining two areas: Argumen-
tation and ATL. Hence, for simplicity, the coalition formation process took place in the initial state
only and did not address the question why agents should cooperate but solely why not to cooperate.
In this paper we propose a way to overcome the latter shortcoming1. Indeed, in [10] it was already
pointed out that in order to join a coalition agents usually require some kind of incentive (i.e. shar-
ing common goals or getting rewards). Here, we take this statement seriously and propose a goal
framework, incorporated into ATLc models, to allow a finer grained modeling of coalitions: Coali-
tional frameworks are used to point out conflicts between agents, and goals refer to agents’ subjective
incentives to join coalitions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we recall the argumentation framework used
for coalition formation and Coalitional ATL. Secondly, we introduce an abstract goal framework and
1The first point was already very briefly addressed in [10]
show how it can be combined with our new logic to model agents’ incentives to join coalitions in a
temporal setting, besides conflicts modeled by coalitional frameworks. We conclude with an example
and discussion of future and related work.
2 PRELIMINARIES: COALITIONS AND ATL
In the next two subsections we briefly recall the argumentative approach to coalition formation [3]
and Coalitional ATL introduced in [10].
2.1 Coalitions and Argumentation
This approach to coalition formation is motivated by [3], where an argumentation framework for
generating coalition structures is defined. The basic notion is that of a coalitional framework (CF)2
modeling conflicts between agents. Such a framework is a tuple CF = (Agt,D) where Agt is a
non-empty set of agents3 and D ⊆ Agt × Agt is a defeat (or attack) relation4 between agents. The
set CF(Agt) denotes all coalitional frameworks over Agt.
Let CF = (Agt,D) be a coalitional framework. For agents a, a′ ∈ Agt, we say that a defeats a′
iff aDa′. The defeat relation represents conflicts between elements of Agt; for instance, two agents
may rely on the same (unique) resource or they may have disagreeing goals, which prevents them
from cooperation.
Defeats are defined between single agents. As we are interested in the formation of coalitions
it is reasonable to consider conflicts between coalitions. In argumentation theory many different se-
mantics have been proposed to define ultimately accepted arguments [12, 11]. Here arguments can
be seen as agents. We apply this rich framework to provide different ways to coalition formation.
Using an abstract viewpoint, a semantics for a coalitional framework CF is a(n) (isomorphism invari-
ant) mapping sem which assigns to a given coalitional framework CF a set of subsets of Agt, i.e.,
sem(CF) ⊆ P(Agt).
In this paper we focus on the stable semantics where a coalition C ⊆ Agt is called stable iff it
is conflict-free (i.e. none of its members is defeating another member) and all agents outside C are
defeated by some member of C; formally, C is stable iff ∀a, a′ ∈ C ¬(aDa′) and ∀a ∈ Agt\C∃a′ ∈
C (a′Da). For more details on various semantics we refer to [10].
Example 1 (Stable coalitions) In Figure 1 {a1, a3} (resp. {a1, a2} and {a1, a2, a3}) is the unique
stable coalition of coalitional framework CF1 (resp. CF2 and CF3).
2.2 Coalitional ATL
In this section we recall Coalitional ATL (ATLc ) from [10].
Definition 1 (LATLc [10]) The logic Coalitional ATL ,LATLc , is given over a finite setAgt = {a1, . . . , ak}
of agents and Π of propositions and consists of all formulae ϕ defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::=p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉γ | 〈|A|〉γ, where
γ ::= iϕ | ¤ϕ | ϕU ϕ
2Differently from [3, 10] we do present argumentation frameworks without preferences.
3We restrict ourselves to agents, in [3, 10] the notion was more generic.
4Without preferences the notions attack and defeat coincide.
p ∈ Π, and A ⊆ Agt. A formula ϕ (resp. γ) is called state (resp. path) formula. Pure ATL is given
by all formulae that do not contain modalities 〈|A|〉.
Informally, 〈〈A〉〉ϕ expresses that agents A have a collective strategy to enforce ϕ. ATLc formulae
include the usual temporal operators: i(in the next state), ¤ (always from now on) and U (strict
until). Additionally, ♦ (now or sometime in the future) can be defined as ♦ϕ ≡ >U ϕ. The intended
reading of 〈|A|〉ϕ is that the group A of agents is able to form a coalition B ⊆ Agt such that A and
B are not disjunct, A ∩ B 6= ∅, and B can enforce ϕ. Coalition formation is modeled by the formal
argumentative approach in the context of coalition formation, as described in the previous section.
Coalitional ATL allows to reason about the ability of building coalition structures, and not only
about an a priori specified group of agents (as it is the case for 〈〈A〉〉ϕ). Compared to pure ATL [2],
a formula like 〈|A|〉ϕ does not refer to the ability of A to enforce ϕ, but rather to the ability of A to
constitute a coalition B, such that A∩B 6= ∅, and then, in a second step, to the ability of B to enforce
ϕ.
Formulae are interpreted over extensions of concurrent game structures [2] by coalitional frame-
works and its tools. A pure concurrent game structure (CGS) is given by a tuple
M = 〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉
consisting of: A set Agt = {a1, . . . , ak} of agents; a set Q of states; a set Π of atomic propositions;
a valuation of propositions pi : Q → P(Π) and a set Act of actions. Function d : Agt×Q → P(Act)
indicates the actions available to agent a ∈ Agt in state q ∈ Q . We often write da(q) instead of
d(a, q), and use d(q) to denote the set da1(q) × · · · × dak(q) of action profiles in state q. Finally, o
is a transition function which maps each state q ∈ Q and action profile ~α = 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈ d(q) to
another state q′ = o(q, ~α).
A computation or path λ = q0q1 · · · ∈ Qω is an infinite sequence of states such that there is a
transition between each qi, qi+1.We define λ[i] = qi to denote the i-th state of λ. The set of all paths
starting in q is defined by ΛM(q).
A (memoryless) strategy of agent a is a function sa : Q → Act such that sa(q) ∈ da(q). We
denote the set of such functions by Σa. A collective strategy sA for team A ⊆ Agt specifies an
individual strategy for each agent a ∈ A; the set of A’s collective strategies is given by ΣA = ×a∈AΣa
and Σ := ΣAgt. The outcome of strategy sA in state q is defined as the set of all paths that may result
from executing sA: out(q, sA) = {λ ∈ ΛM(q) | ∀i ∈ N0 ∃~α = 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈ d(λ[i]) ∀a ∈ A (αa =
saA(λ[i]) ∧ o(λ[i], ~α) = λ[i+ 1])}, where saA denotes agent a’s part of the collective strategy sA.
Finally, models for Coalitional ATL are given by CGS’s extended by ζ : Q → (P(Agt) →
CF(Agt)), a function which assigns a coalitional framework over Agt to each state of the model
subjective to a given group of agents5, and an (argumentative) semantics sem .
Definition 2 (CGM) A coalitional game modelCGM is given byM = 〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o, ζ, sem〉
where the first 7-tuple is a CGS, ζ : Q → (P(Agt) → CF(Agt)), and sem is an argumentation se-
mantics. The set of all CGM’s over the denoted elements is defined as M(Agt,Q ,Π, Act, sem, ζ).
Often, we will leave out the parameters and assume the standard element names.
Truth of LATLc formulae is defined below.
Definition 3 (ATLc [10]) Let M∈M. Semantics of ϕ, ψ ∈ LATLc is given as follows:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q)





(α, ?, α) (α, α, ?)
CF1: a1 a2 a3
CF2: a1 a2 a3
CF3: a3 a2 a1
Figure 1: A simple CGS and three coalitional frameworks. There are three agents a1, a2, and a3 each of them
can perform action α or β; ? is a placeholder for any of the two. Action profiles not mentioned explicitly cause
the system to stay in the same state; for example, o(q1, (β, α, α)) = q1. In the coalitional frameworks CF1,
CF2, and CF3 attacks are represented by arcs; for instance, agent a2 attacks a3 in CF1.
M, q |= ¬ϕ iff M, q 6|= ϕ
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, q |= ϕ and M, q |= ψ
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉 iϕ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such that M, λ[1] |= ϕ for all λ ∈ out(q, sA)
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉¤ϕ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such that M, λ[i] |= ϕ for all λ ∈ out(q, sA) and i ∈ N0
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕU ψ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such that, for all λ ∈ out(q, sA), there is i ∈ N0 with
M, λ[i] |= ψ, and M, λ[j] |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i.
M, q |= 〈|A|〉γ iff there is a valid coalition B wrt A and q such that M, q |= 〈〈B〉〉γ.
where B is called valid6 if, and only if, B ∈ sem(ζ(q, A)) and A ∩B 6= ∅.
Example 2 (Simple CGM) We consider the CGS shown in Figure 1. We can extend the model to a
CGMM as described in the following. We set ζ(q0) = CF3 and ζ(q) = CF2 for q = q1, q2 and use
the stable semantics as argumentation semantics. Then we have, for instance, thatM, q0 |= ¬〈〈X〉〉♦t
for X ( Agt and M, q0 |= 〈〈Agt〉〉♦t; hence, also M, q0 |= 〈|a2|〉♦t since Agt is a stable coalition in
q0.
3 COOPERATION OF AGENTS WITH GOALS
Why should agents join coalitions? They must have reasons to do so. In this paper, we consider goals
as the driving force, and consequently, we assume that agents act to reach their goals. Firstly, we
propose an abstract goal framework. Secondly, we use specific languages for goals and objectives,
and we propose ATL as a suitable language to capture agents’ goals. Finally, we implement goals
into the semantics of ATLc, discuss its benefits and illustrate it with an example.
3.1 Goals and Agents
Pro-activeness and social ability are among the widely accepted characteristics of intelligent agents [15].
In BDI frameworks, goals (or desires) and beliefs play an important role [9, 14].
We believe that also the social ability to join coalitions, should be based on some incentive. Agents
are usually not developed to offer their services for free. Also in the agent programming community
several types of goals (e.g. achievement or maintenance goals) are commonly considered as an agent’s
driving force. Here, we present a simple abstract framework to deal with these notions.
6The original definition in [10] was slightly different. Firstly, we assumed that A is always a valid coalition (i.e.B ∈
sem(ζ(q, A)) ∪ {A}); and secondly, as mentioned above the function ζ was agents independent (i.e. ζ : Q → CF(Agt)).
We come back to these modification in Section 3.3.
Definition 4 (G, goal mapping g) Let Ga be a non-empty set of elements (set of goals), one for each
agent a ∈ Agt, and G := ⋃a∈Agt Ga. By “g” we denote a typical element from G. A goal mapping is
a function g : Agt→ (Q+ → P(G)) assigning a set of goals to a given sequence of states and agent.
So, a goal mapping assigns a set of goals to a history, depending on an agent. This is needed
to introduce goals into CGM’s. The history dependency can be used, for instance, to model when a
goal should be removed from the list: An agent having a goal ♦s may drop it after reaching a state in
which s holds. Alternatively, a model update mechanism can be used to achieve the same regarding
state-based goal mappings; however, in our opinion the former is more elegant.
An agent might have several goals. Often, goals can not be reached simultaneously which requires
means to decide which goal should be selected first. We model this by a preference ordering.
Definition 5 (Goal preference relation) A goal preference ordering (gp-ordering) ¹ over a set of
goals G ′ ⊆ G is a complete, transitive, antisymmetric, and irreflexive relation ¹⊆ G ′ × G ′. We say
that a goal g is preferred to g′ if g ¹ g′.
Given a goal mapping ga for a ∈ Agt we assume that there implicitly also is a gp-ordering ¹a
(a’s gp-ordering).
So far, we did not say how goals can be actually used to form coalitions. We assume, given some
task, that agents having goals satisfied or partly satisfied by the outcome of the task are willing to
cooperate to bring about the task. In the following we will use the notion objective (or objective
formula) to refer to both the task itself and the outcome of it. A typical objective is written as o.
Agents which have goals fulfilled or at least partly supported by objective o are possible candidates
to participate in a coalition aiming at o.
We say that an objective o satisfies goal g, o ↪→ g, if the complete goal g is fulfilled after o has
been accomplished. If a goal is (partly) satisfied by o we say that o supports g, o ↪→s g; i.e. there is
another goal g′ which is a subgoal of g and which is satisfied. These notions will be made precise in
the following sections. Intuitively, an objective ¤t satisfies goal ¤(t ∨ s) an supports goal ♦t.
3.2 Specifying Goals and Objectives
In this section, we propose ATL (resp. ATLc) as a goal specification language. It has been shown
that temporal logics like linear-time temporal logic (LTL) and computation tree logic (CTL) can be
used as goal specification languages [5, 8, 7].
Goals formulated in LTL are very intuitive. Formulae like♦rich (eventually being rich), itakeUmbrella
(take umbrella in the next moment), or ¤♦sleep (going to sleep again and again) have clear inter-
pretations. But goals formulated in CTL can be ambiguous. A goal like A♦rich7 does not seem
fundamentally different from ♦rich from the agent’s point of view. Its goal of being rich in the future
can be read implicitly as being rich in all possible futures; only one of them can actually become true
and in that particular one the agent wants to be rich.
In this section we will use ATL for expressing agents’ goals. At first glance, this seems to con-
tradict the statement made above since CTL can be seen as a special case (the one agent fragment)
of ATL. But this is not the case: CTL refers to a purely temporal setting whereas ATL talks about
abilities of agents. Here is a clarifying example. Assume that there are two agents a and b both hav-
ing access to the same critical section; that is, either a or b should access this section but not both. In
such a case it is reasonable that agent a has the goal of preventing b to enter this section on its own:
¬〈〈b〉〉♦critical. However, it might be acceptable for a that b together with another agent c enters the







































Figure 2: Two simple models showing that ATL goals are useful. ? ∈ {α, β} is used as a placeholder for any
of the two actions.
critical section because then c has to unlock resources a could use instead. Let us consider a more
detailled example.
Example 3 (ATL-goals) In the example we consider two agents a and b. Both agents can perform
actions α and β. The first agent, leader of a research group, would like to get a better salary (bs)
and wants to retain the power to decide when to take vacation (vac). So, a’s goal can be expressed as
γ ≡ ¤(¬now → bs ∧ vac). Interpreting the models shown in Figure 2 purely temporal (i.e. without
action profiles) the CTL formula Eγ is satisfied in q0 in both models: There are q0-paths which satisfy
γ. On the other hand, Aγ is false in both models in q0.
Now agent b enters the scene. A higher salary would require a to move to a company in which the
agent has a boss who might be able to decide on a’s vacation (depending on the contract). Actually,
although a would like to have a better salary he prefers to decide on his vacation on his own. Thus,
his goal can be reformulated to γ′ ≡ ¤(¬now → bs ∧ ¬〈〈b〉〉♦¬vac), or equivalently in this example
¤(¬now → bs ∧ 〈〈a〉〉¤vac). Now, it is easy to see that M1, q0 |= 〈〈a〉〉γ′ but M2, q0 6|= 〈〈a〉〉γ′. In
the first model b does not have the power to decide on a’s vacation but b has this ability in the second
model.
This quite simplistic example shows that ATL formulae can make sense as goal specification
language.
Definition 6 (ATL-Goal) Let γ, γ′ be ATL path formulae. An ATL-goal has the form γ or γ ∧ γ′8.
Note that goals can easily be defined as Coalitional ATL formulae; however, due to simplicity we
stick to pure ATL formulae.
It remains to define the objective language. Consider the ATLc formula 〈|A|〉γ. The question is
whether there is a rational group to bring about γ; thus, only agents which gain advantage when γ is
fulfilled should cooperate. Hence, we consider γ as objective; so, in general all Coalitional ATL path
formulae.
Definition 7 (ATLc -objective) An ATLc -objective is an LATLc path formula.
3.3 Goals as a Means for Cooperation
In this section we link together Coalitional ATL with the goal framework described above. The syntax
of the logic is given as in Section 2.2. The necessary change takes place in the semantics. We redefine
what it means for a coalition to be valid.
8Note that γ ∧ γ′ is not an ATL path formula anymore.
Up to now valid coalitions were solely determined by coalitional frameworks. Conflicts repre-
sented by such frameworks are a coarse, but necessary, criterion for a successful coalition formation
process. However, nothing is said about incentives to join coalitions, only why coalitions should not
be joined.
Goals allow to capture the first issue. For a given objective formula o and a finite sequence of
states, called history, we do only consider agents which have some goal supported by the current
objective. CGM’s with goals are given as a straightforward extension of CGM’s (cf. Definition 2).
Definition 8 (CGM with goals) A CGM with goals (CGMg)M is given by a model ofM(Q ,Agt,Π, sem, ζ)
extended by a set of goals G and a goal mapping g over G. The set of all such models is denoted
Mg(Q ,Agt,Π, sem, ζ,G, g) or just Mg if we assume standard naming.
To define the semantics we need some additional notation. Given a path λ ∈ Qω we use λ[i, j]
to denote the sequence λ[i]λ[i + 1] . . . λ[j] for i, j ∈ N0 ∪ {∞} and i ≤ j. A history is a finite
sequence h = q1 . . . qn ∈ Q+, h[i] denotes state qi if n ≥ i, qn for i ≥ n, and ε for i < 0 where
i ∈ Z ∪ {∞}. Furthermore, given a history h and a path or history λ the combined path/history
starting with h extended by λ is denoted by h ◦ λ.
Finally, we present the semantics of ATLc with goals. It is similar to Definition 3. Here, however,
it is necessary to keep track of the steps, visited states, made to determine the goals of the agents.
Definition 9 (Semantics of LvcgATL) Let M be a CGMg, q a state, ϕ, ψ state-, γ a path formula, and
i, j ∈ N0. Semantics to LvcgATL formulae is given as follows:
M, q, τ |= p iff p ∈ pi(q)
M, q, τ |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, q, τ |= ϕ and M, q, τ |= ψ
M, q, τ |= ¬ϕ iff not M, q, τ |= ϕ
M, q, τ |= 〈〈A〉〉γ iff there is a strategy sA ∈ ΣA such that for all λ ∈ out(q, sA) it holds that
M, λ, τ |= ϕ
M, q, τ |= 〈|A|〉γ iff there is A′ ∈ VCg(q, A, γ, τ) such that M, q, τ |= 〈〈A〉〉γ
M, λ, τ |= ϕ iff M, λ[0], τ |= ϕ
M, λ, τ |= ¤ϕ iff for all i it holds that M, λ[i], τ ◦ λ[1, i] |= ϕ
M, λ, τ |= iϕ iff it holds that M, λ[1], τ ◦ λ[1] |= ϕ
M, λ, τ |= ϕU ψ iff there is a j such that M, λ[j], τ ◦ λ[1, j] |= ψ and for all 0 ≤ i < j it holds that
M, λ[i], τ ◦ λ[1, i] |= ϕ.
Ultimately, we are interested in M, q |= ϕ defined as M, q, q |= ϕ.
All the new functionality provided by goals is captured by the new valid coalition function VCg
Definition 10 (Valid coalitions,VCg(q, A, o, τ)) Let M ∈ Mg, τ ∈ Q+, A,B ⊆ Agt, o an ATLc
objective.
We say that B is a valid coalition after τ with respect to A, o, and M if, and only if,
1. B ∈ sem(ζ(τ [∞])(A)), A ∩B 6= ∅, and
2. there are goals gbi ∈ gbi(τ), one per agent bi ∈ B, such that o ↪→M,τ,B gb1 ∧ · · · ∧ gb|B|
The set VCg(q, A, o, τ) consists of all such valid coalitions wrt to M.
Thus, for the definition of valid coalitions among other things, a goal mapping, a function ζ and a
sequence of states τ are required. The intuition of τ is that it represents the history (the sequence of
states visited so far including the current state). So, τ is used to determine which goals of the agents
are still active.
The main semantical differences from the version defined in [10] (cf. Definition 3) are as follows:
1. Goals are used to rule out an agent’s membership in coalitions.
2. Coalitional frameworks are assigned to states and depend on groups of agents.
3. It is not required that a forming coalition A, specified by VCg(. . . , A, . . . ), is completely con-
tained in B in order to validate B: We just assume that the formed coalition should contain
some member of A.
4. The forming coalition A is not valid by definition.
Note that the last point is a generalization. The “old” operator 〈|A|〉oldγ as defined in [10] which
assumes that A is always an acceptable coalition can easily be expressed by 〈|A|〉newγ ∨ 〈〈A〉〉γ where
〈|A|〉new is equal to the former but the new version given in Definition 3 (cf. Definition 9 for a path-
based semantics) of valid coalition is used. Hence, A is only a possible candidate coalition if it is
actually acceptable according to the argumentation semantics.
Finally, we have to define when a goal is satisfied. Although the definition of support can be
defined similarly, we focus on the former notion only.
Definition 11 (Satisfaction of goals) Let g be an ATL-goal, o an LvcgATL-objective, and τ ∈ Q+. We
say that objective o satisfies g, for short o ↪→M,τ,B g, with respect toM, τ , and B if, and only if, there
is a strategy sB ∈ ΣB such that
1. for all λ ∈ out(τ [∞], sB) it holds that M, λ, τ |= o implies M, λ |= g, and
2. that there is some path λ ∈ out(τ [∞], sB) with M, λ, τ |= o.
A goal is satisfied by an objective if each path (enforceable by B) that satisfies the objective does
also satisfy the goal. That is, satisfaction of the objective will guarantee that the goal becomes true.
The second condition ensures that the coalition actually has a way to bring about the goal. We show
later, however, that the second condition is superfluous using the semantics defined in Defintion 9.
It remains to define the semantics for combined (by conjunction) ATL path formulae. There-
fore, we extend the ordinary semantics of ATL (given in Definition 3 without the 〈|A|〉-rule) by the
following semantic rule: M, λ |= γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn iff M, λ |= γi for i = 1, . . . , n.
Coming back to the satisfaction of goals. Let 〈|A|〉′ denote a coalitional operator with semantics
equal to 〈|A|〉 but without the second condition in Definition 11 (note that this definition is needed to
determine the valid coalitions).
Proposition 1 Let γ be an ATLc path formula, M∈Mg, q ∈ QM, A ⊆ Agt, and τ ∈ Q+. Then we
have that M, q, τ |= 〈|A|〉γ if, and only if, M, q, τ |= 〈|A|〉′γ
Proof. The proof is simple. Firstly, observe that ∀λ ∈ out(q, sB) (λ |= γ) implies ∃λ ∈ out(q, sB) (λ |=
γ) since the outcome is never empty. Then we have q, τ |= 〈|A|〉γ iff ∃B ∈ VCg ∃sB ∈ ΣB ∀λ ∈
out(q, sB) (λ, τ |= γ) iff ∃B ∈ VCg ∃sB ∈ ΣB (∀λ ∈ out(q, sB) (λ, τ |= γ) and ∃λ ∈ out(q, sB) (λ, τ |=
γ)) (?) iff ∃B ∈ VCg′ (q, τ |= 〈〈B〉〉γ) iff q, τ |= 〈|A|〉′γ where VCg′ is equal to VCg except for con-
dition 2 in Definition 11. Finally, it is easy to observe that the equivalence (?) holds since we can just
take sB as goal satisfaction strategy. (We omitted the model and the parameters of VCg ad VCg
′
.) ¥
Remark 2 (Preferred goals) In the abstract goal framework presented in Section 3.1 we defined a
preference ordering over goals. The gp-orderings highly influence the coalition formation process.
However, for this paper we decided to focus on the pure goal framework since the interplay between
the formation process becomes much more sophisticated if preferences are taken into account. We just
give a brief motivation for preferences and why they increase the complexity of coalition building.
The set of valid coalitions consists of all coalitions which are acceptable/conflict-free (according
to a coalitional framework) and in which all agents have an incentive to join the coalition (that is,
some goal has to be satisfied/supported). Let us consider two valid groups B and B′ both containing
the agent a. Both groups are somewhat appealing for a since they satisfy some of his goals, say B
(resp. B′) can bring about g (resp. g′). In our framework B and B′ are treated equally good. Is
this reasonable? From an abstract level it is; however, a finer grained analysis should incorporate
the preferences between goals. If, for instance, g is preferred over g′ agent a should rather go for
coalition B instead of B′. The agent would prefer to bring about g thus joining B. On the other hand,
if a refuses to join B′ it might be possible, by a symmetric argument, that another agent, say b, refuses
to take part in B, such that in the end neither B nor B′ will form. Of course, in such a situation both
agents prefer to bring about their less preferred goals. This is still better than getting nothing.
This reasoning very much reminds on game theoretic rationality concepts. For example, the mo-
tivation behind a Nash equilibrium strategy shows a strong connection: No agent has an incentive to
unilaterally choose another strategy. Even closer are concepts from cooperative game theory. This
discussion shows how interesting the incorporation of a preference ordering over goals is. However,
this is also the reason why we did not incorporate it in the formation process here, it would be out of
the scope of this paper. Our current research deals with this issue.
3.4 Progression of ATL goals
A goal mapping takes the history into account to be able to reflect if a goal has become fulfilled. For
example, if an agent has goal ♦p and p became satisfied in a state on the current history the goal
should be marked as completed in the following state. (Of course, a new goal in this state can again
be ♦p.) Another, more practical but also restricted option, is to consider an initial goal base GB and
modify, specialize or remove, the formulae according to the steps taken. So, goal ♦p ∧ ¤q should
be specialized to ¤q if a state is reached in which p holds. In [6] such a progression procedure is
presented for first-order LTL.
4 AN EXAMPLE
In our example we consider a simple (political) coalition formation scenario. The scenario consists
of five agents Agt = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5}. Agents one to four try to form a coalition and agent a5 has
the role of an independent entity controlling the process. He has to agree with any formed coalition
before it can be constituted. The scenario is modeled in Figure 3 and is explained below. Arcs are
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Figure 3: A CGS modeling a coalition formation scenario.
standard representation via action profiles. For instance, an arc labeled with {a1, a2} corresponds to
an action profile 〈α, β, ?, ?, ?〉 depending only on the choices of agents a1 and a2. Next we define
how to determine acceptable coalitions; that is, coalitions which can in principle be formed. This is
modeled by coalitional frameworks. For simplicity, and due to the reason that our focus is on goals
(the new concept in this paper), we assume coalitions which do not contain a subgroup consisting of
a1 together with a2 or a3 at the same time are acceptable; that is, for all states q and all coalitions A
we set sem(ζ(q)(A)) = {C ∈ P(Agt) | {a1, a2}, {a1, a3} 6⊆ C}.
The story behind the picture is as follows (where we are particularly interested in agent a1). Agent
a1’s main interest is to have power and to decide on it on his own, this is modeled by ♦〈〈1〉〉¤power1:
Sometime in the future agent a1 wants to ensure (on his own) to stay in power forever. Besides that (if
his primary goal can for instance not be fulfilled) the agent does not want that agents a2 and a3 have
the ability to form a coalition on their own (permitted by a5). This is also reflected in the coalitional
frameworks. Intuitively, a1 and a2 (resp. a3) are political opponents and cannot agree on similar
goals. The latter goal can be expressed as ATL path formula: ¤¬〈〈a2, a3〉〉♦agree2,3. In principal, all
agents can agree to achieve an agreement: q0 |= 〈〈Agt〉〉 iagree1,2,3,4. However, this coalition is not
rational due to the coalitional framework which prohibits a1 to be in the same coalition as a2 and a3.
Thus, we have that q0 6|= 〈|X|〉 iagree1,2,3,4 for all X ⊆ Agt.
In state q0 agent a1 can decide to opt out of the coalition formation process; however, this opens
the possibility for {a2, a3} to enforce agree2,3 (without good reason a5 will not interfere). Thus, we
have q2 |= 〈〈a2, a3, a5〉〉 iagree2,3, q2 |= 〈|a2|〉 iagree2,3, and q2 |= 〈|a3|〉 iagree2,3 if we assume that
a2 and a3 have, for instance, the goal ♦agree2,3. The unique path satisfing the first three formulae does
also satisfy the latter goal. However, a1 still has the option to convince a5 (by giving money) to veto
coalition {a2, a3}, thus q0 |= 〈|a1|〉¤¬agree2,3 assuming that agent a5 likes to get money (♦money5).
Finally, for the same reason a1 (resp. a4) together with a5 are able to form a coalition which prevents
a2 or a3 to reach an agreement on their own: q0 |= 〈|X|〉♦agree1,4 where X ∈ {{a1, a5}, {a4, a5}}.
Agent a4 needs additional money to be able to take part in a coalition.
5 RELATED WORK, CONCLUSION
Related Work. Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL), proposed in [1], follows an idea similar to our pro-
posal but the focus is different: While we aim at rational coalitions, in [1] the focus is on succinctness
of formulae.
The authors introduce a new operator 〈P 〉 which is read as follows: “there exists a coalition
C satisfying property P such that C can achieve φ”. However, P describes purely set theoretic
properties (e.g. A ⊂ B) and the quantification takes place in modal operators (as in 〈|A|〉). In addition
to that, QCL is no more expressive than coalition logic [13] where our proposal extends ATL by new
concepts.
Indeed, quantification in the objective language is mentioned in the QCL paper, too (and also
served as motivation for this paper). But it is not further pursued because of the high computational
complexity. We believe, however, that quantification in the object language is justifiable by its addi-
tional expressive power: Complexity is always a tradeoff wrt expressiveness. The syntax can often be
suitably restricted (number of coalitional variables, nestings of quantifiers and so forth) to get better
computational complexity.
Conclusion. We have introduced goals to the logic Coalitional ATL, which allows to model the
coalition formation process. In the goal framework we proposed ATL as a suitable language to
formulate them. Finally, these goals can be implemented using Coalitional ATL.
We did not comment on complexity issues wrt model checking of our logic. Also the interplay
with fixed points operators seems to be an interesting issue for further research.
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